Abstract Exfiltration of private data from mobile devices is a potential security threat. Previous research concerning such threats has generally focused on techniques that are only valid over short distances (e.g., NFC, Bluetooth, electromagnetic emanations) or fail to be entirely covert. In this research, we develop and analyze an exfiltration attack that has no distance limitation and is completely covert. Specifically, we take advantage of vulnerabilities in Android that enable us to covertly record and exfiltrate a voice call. This paper presents a successful implementation of our attack, which records a call (both uplink and downlink voice streams), and subsequently transmits the recorded voice over an inaudible call. No visual or audio indication is given to the victim during the record or replay phases of the attack. We provide a detailed exposition of our attack, and we briefly consider the challenge of providing strong counter measures to such attacks.
Introduction
Exfiltration of private data is a threat on mobile devices. Published attacks designed to exfiltrate data from mobile devices have used communication channels such as NFC, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi, and FM radio receivers found in those devices [5, 9] . Availability of these features on mobile devices also provide opportunities for using them as receivers for data exfiltration from other non-mobile devices, for example, via electromagnetic emanations [12] . While these media are commonly found in mobile devices, relying on such media results in attacks for which distance from the target is a limiting fac- tor. This limitation, however, is absent if the cellular network itself is used for exfiltration.
The cellular network can be vulnerable to attack due to the fact that in most mobile phones the cellular interface (also known as baseband) is controlled by the main processor, a feature that leaves cellular media vulnerable to attack [11, 16] . Some published work explores the possibility of using a text channel provided by the cellular network as a medium for exfiltration [6] . While texting over a cellular network does remove any distance limitation, it suffers from the facts that a data plan must be associated with the mobile device, and text usage appears on the phone bill, which would likely make such an attack transient, at best.
In this research, we show that the audio medium of a voice call can be used for exfiltration. There are several potential advantages to using such audio for exfiltration. In contrast to the methods discussed above, voice does not have any distance limitation, and such usage is less likely to be observed on a bill. The main problem in using the audio media is that the voice calls are visually indicated and audible.
We demonstrate that a voice call can be made completely covert-soundless and with no visual cue to the phone user. We instantiate our attack to covertly record a call. We also show that we can soundlessly replay recorded audio data to an incoming call, thus exfiltration the data, without any visual (or audio) indication. In our implementation, incoming calls can be independently selected for either covert recording or covert replay of audio data. Soundlessness and the absence of visual cues together render a completely covert channel for exfiltration of a voice call.
In this paper we illustrate our covert exfiltration attack for two types of audio data-a recorded call conversation and a music file. There is published work [1, 6, 9] showing examples of modulating data and video for exfiltration. Based on this previous work, it is clear that our work can easily be extended to covertly exfiltrate any type of data.
Our attack implementation makes use of known vulnerabilities in Android, including device rooting, easily exportable hidden APIs, installation of modules as shared libraries, and the ability to run one application inside the process of another. We demonstrate the exploitation of these vulnerabilities so as to encourage the development of countermeasures to mitigate such security threats.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides the essential background information needed to understand our implementation. In Sect. 2, we give an overview of related work, and we discuss ways that our work contrasts with-or builds upon-the key ideas presented in some previous work. Section 3 discusses our implementation in detail. Section 4 describes experiments that we have conducted to verify the claimed covertness of our attack. Finally, in Sect. 6, we give our conclusions.
Background
This section discusses Android related topics that are necessary to understand our attack implementation. We also briefly discuss related prior work and contrast this work to ours.
A simplified view of the Android reference architecture is given in Table 1 . Note that this is a layered architecture-the lower layers providing services to the upper layers. Android applications use the Java Application Programming Interface (API) exported from the Java/Framework layer. The Framework layer APIs realize their functionality by using the services provided by the Hardware Abstraction Layer (HAL) components, which are implemented in C/C++. The Java API use the Java Native Interface (JNI) to transact with the HAL API. The Android Open Source Project (AOSP) provides the source code and build tools for the Framework/Java API, JNI, and HAL API for all published versions of Android [2] . The HAL API interact with the Linux kernel through software drivers provided mostly by device vendors. The lowest layer consists of various hardware such as audio devices, baseband, and GPS. Baseband devices interface with the cellular network and such devices form a major hardware components in any mobile device.
Android functional modules, such as Telephony and Audio, conform to the Android reference architecture. Sections 2.1 and 2.2 present the essential elements of the Telephony and the Audio stacks, respectively. The material presented in these sections provide sufficient background for our attack implementation, which is presented in Sect. 3. For additional details on the Telephony stack, see [14] , and for a more details on the Audio stack, see [4] .
Telephony stack
The Telephony stack implements the control path of a voice call, whereas the voice path itself is implemented in the Audio stack. The purpose of the control path is to process signals from the underlying baseband device as well as from the phone user, and to manage the life cycle of a voice call.
For our purposes, the main components of interest in the Telephony stack are the Radio Interface Layer (RIL), BasePhone, CallManager, and CallNotifier. Each of these components are class objects. The RIL interfaces with the RIL daemon in the HAL via a Linux socket for receiving or sending call signals to the underlying software device driver (aka the vendor-specific RIL) that controls the baseband device. Drake et al. discuss the RIL and its related components in detail [7] .
An internal PhoneApp application configures the Telephony stack by interconnecting the components so that they form a layered hierarchy. The upper layer component registers with the lower layer to get notifications for certain events. The lower layer notifies its registered upper layer components when a registered event occurs. The RIL, BasePhone, CallManager, and CallNotifier form a stack sequence. The interactions between these components can be summarized as follows.
• The RIL is at the lowest layer.
• BasePhoneholds the reference to the underlying implementation of a phone object, such as GSMPhone or CDMAPhone. BasePhone in turn is referenced by the ProxyPhone object. Also, BasePhone registers itself as an RIL object to receive and send call control signals.
• CallManager registers with BasePhone for almost all telephony events and hence is notified by BasePhone.
• CallNotifier implements the call indication User Interface (UI) for incoming calls. This is relevant for our work, since CallNotifier shows the call indications when CallManager notifies it of an incoming call. 
Audio stack
The Audio stack manages the audio hardware devices, such as speaker, earpiece, voice call device, bluetooth, headset, earphone, and so on. The stack provides device control, including discovery of a device, enabling a device, and muting. In addition to controlling and managing the individual audio devices, one of the main functions of the Audio stack is to manage and control the audio paths. Figure 2 shows the main components of Audio stack during a voice call.
An audio path from any physical audio devices is known as an audio channel. The digital audio data flowing through a channel is referred to as an audio stream. The voice channel and the voice stream refer to the audio channel and the audio stream, respectively, during a voice call.
In this paper, we are interested in the management of the voice streams and voice channels during a call. The voice stream during a call is coded in Pulse Code Modulation (PCM) using 16 bits for each sample. The voice call device refers to a virtual device that provides and handles the voice channels and the voice streams during a call, all the way to the Baseband via the HAL interface. The Audio stack uses tinyalsa as the HAL layer to control, read, and write voice data during a call. At the HAL, tinyalsa provides the API to read and write PCM data streams. These PCM streams are routed and mixed by AudioFlinger and AudioMixer, respectively.
A voice path during a voice call consists of two channelsone for uplink and one for downlink. The uplink voice channel takes the voice stream from an input device, such as a microphone or bluetooth, to the baseband. The downlink channel carries the voice streams from the baseband to an output device, such as a speaker, earpiece, earphone, or bluetooth. One of the main functions of the Audio stack is to provide pathways to audio streams by switching them among multiple channels. In addition to switching the streams between channels, the stack also provides a mixer for re-sampling and mixing the audio streams to improve audio quality, and to feed the streams to appropriate channels. Typically, both uplink and downlink voice streams are mixed and fed to the speaker.
The switching and mixing of audio streams is controlled by a policy manager, which runs as a system service and is implemented by the AudioPolicyManagerBase.cpp module in the HAL. The switch and mixer are implemented in the HAL by the AudioFlinger and AudioMixer modules, respectively. The policy manager defines and creates the pathways. The policy manager uses an external configuration file, audio_policy.conf, located in the /etc/ directory.
The policy configuration is a plaintext file. It defines the input and output audio devices and their profiles. A profile defines the device characteristics used by the mixer and flinger. For example, the profile for a voice call device defines the number of bits per sample, sampling rate, number of channels to be mixed, and so on. The AudioPolicyManagerBase reads this configuration information at boot time and creates an internal data structure for AudioFlinger. If the external audio policy configuration file is not present, the policy manager creates a default configuration for each device. The audio policy manager creates a data structure that represents the configuration information that is used by the flinger and mixer modules. The flinger switches the streams among the defined pathways based on the configuration information. Prior to switching the streams to a channel, the flinger sends the stream to the mixer with appropriate mixing parameters. The output of the mixer is then fed to the destination channel.
The Audio stack publishes AudioRecord and AudioTrack APIs to applications for use in reading or writing audio streams to user files. AudioRecord outputs a specified stream for writing to an external file, while AudioTrack feeds a user stream to an audio output device via the flinger. We discuss AudioRecord and AudioTrack in the next two section.
Audio recording
As the name implies, AudioRecord is used for audio recording. The API returns the audio stream from a userrequested audio input device. The API takes the audio input device as the audio source parameter. AudioRecord.java implements the user interface of the API and AudioRecord.cpp implements the main functionality. In the user interface layer, the provided parameters are validated and a call to the JNI is made. The JNI creates the AudioRecord.cpp object and invokes the set method of this object. The set method in turn makes a call to the flinger to open an output channel that can be used to provide an outlet for the stream requested by the user. The flinger reads the device information and its profile from the configuration data created by the policy manager to validate the user request.
At this point the user request for the stream output can be accepted or declined, depending on the policy defined by the configuration information. Assuming the request is validated and accepted, the AudioRecord object creates buffers that are shared between the user thread and the flinger. That is, the flinger will output the requested stream in the shared buffer. The user is expected to consume the stream data from the buffer to prevent any overrun. AudioRecord provides a read method to extract stream data from the buffer. After every read, the buffer is released.
The Android site [2] specifically mentions voice call device as one of the possible input devices that can be accepted by the API. However, starting with Android 4.0, the voice call "device" implies only the uplink voice channel from the microphone-the downlink voice channel is simply ignored by the API. This is significant for our attack, since it prevents straightforward recording of both sides of a call.
Audio replay
AudioTrack is used by applications to write a user audio stream to an audio output device, such as a speaker or bluetooth. AudioTrack.java implements the user interface and AudioTrack.cpp implements the main functionality. The JNI interface provides the transition and data transfer between the two modules. Figure 3 shows how this API interfaces with the HAL layer. From Fig. 3 , we see that the user interface transfers control to the JNI after a preliminary validation of user arguments. The JNI creates the AudioTrack.cpp object and calls its set method. The set method in turn makes a call to the flinger for opening an input channel that can provide the user stream a path to the requested device for output. The flinger validates the user request using configuration information created by the policy manager. An input channel is opened or declined, depending on the configuration information. The implementation does not support a user stream to feed a voice call directly, as there is no standalone voice call device configuration available. In addition, the flinger and mixer are configured in such a way that the user audio stream is never routed to a voice call. This configuration allows the downstream voice channel to be connected only to audible devices such as a speaker, headphone, earpiece, or bluetooth. The upstream voice channel can only be fed from the microphone or bluetooth. Any alteration to this scheme would require a major code change in flinger. The bottom line here is that the implementation of the AudioTrack API makes it difficult to generate an inaudible voice call.
Previous work on Android covert channels
Previous work has been published demonstrating proof of concept implementations of covert audio channels in Android, for the purpose of data exfiltration. As discussed in more detail below, this previous work can be categorized by its use of one of the following two approaches.
• Modulate the data and transmit it in the inaudible frequency range through an audio media.
• Modulate the data and transmitting it in the audible range using the voice path.
Transmitting data in the inaudible range requires the adversary mobile device to be located in close proximity to the compromised device. On the other hand, data transmitted in the audible range is not truly covert.
The work of Do et al. [6] considers the use of SMS and audio media to covertly exfiltrate data from a mobile device. Do et al. argue that SMS and audio media are commonly available on mobile devices and exfiltration over these media is difficult to prevent. The authors propose the SMS medium for long range and "large" data exfiltration, while they propose the audio medium for short range and "small" data exfiltration.
The scheme proposed by Do et al. for using audio medium for exfiltration relies on the fact that speakers and microphones on mobile devices can generate and receive audio frequencies outside the human audible range. Their work uses inaudibly broadcast key-press sequences from the victim phone speaker that are received by a microphone on the adversary phone. The victim phone generates a binary sequence that is converted to the inaudible frequency range before broadcasting from the speaker. Frequencies of 20, 22, and 21 kHz are used to represent 0, 1 and space, respectively. The sequence 101 is sent without any spacer to indicate completion of the binary bit pattern.
This scheme of Do et al. suffers from serious limitations inherent in the chosen media of exfiltration. Use of SMS can face limited availability of and has a significant risk of detection. Availability of SMS depends on the service plan of the mobile phone, and can be detected by the usage record on the phone bill. The user can be visibly warned and further transmission can be blocked when the size of exfiltration exceeds the permissible data capacity of the phone, as provided by the service plan.
In [6] , base64 encoding is used to convert data to text prior to sending it via SMS. The resulting encoded data is split into a series of SMS messages prior to transmission. As messages via SMS are not guaranteed to be delivered in sequence, the receiver uses message indexes inserted by the sender to reassemble the messages in order. The messages are deleted immediately after sending so as to avoid detection at the victim phone.
The audio scheme proposed in [6] suffers from distance limitation and data transmission errors due to noise present in the medium. The authors of [6] found that the reception accuracy was 100 % up to 1.7 m, while the method was completely ineffective at 3.7 m. In a noisy cafe environment, effective distances were significantly less.
Work by Guri et al. [9] presents covert data exfiltration from a computer with the aid of a mobile phone. The data (text or binary) from the computer is first modulated to audio tones using either Audio Frequency Shift Keying (A-FSK) or Dual Tone Multiple-Frequency (DTMF). The audio signal is then frequency modulated using a carrier frequency in the FM radio range. This carrier frequency is generated by the video display unit by constructing an image consisting of an alternating sequence of black and white pixels. Once emanated from the video display unit, the signal is an FM signal that can be received by the FM radio in a mobile phone. This FM audio is recorded by the mobile phone by modifying the MediaRecorder class to extract and demodulate the data. To avoid potential detection by reception of changing tones in the FM radio, the FM reception band is changed.
The work in Guri et al. suffers from distance limitation. Their results show that data could be transmitted with 97.73 % accuracy up to a maximum distance of 7 m. In addition, the transmission method is slow, with approximately 11 h required to transfer raw data of size 0.5 MB.
The work of Aloraini [1] attempts to use a voice call as the covert media for transmitting audio modulated text data. In this work, a call monitor is inserted within the telephony stack to watch for an incoming call from a predetermined number.
Upon receiving a call from that number, the call is connected without any visual indication. The text data is converted to audio using FSK modulation prior to transmission. The transmission of data however, remains audible. Moreover, the phone user cannot make any call during the exfiltration. This work claims covertness by arguing that the modulated signal sound is not human intelligible. The audibility and user call blocking, however, makes the attack detectable, raising some doubt about its covertness. In addition, the work is not suitable for large data exfiltration as the phone will remain blocked during the entire duration of the exfiltration. The scheme is also not suitable for exfiltration of voice data, such as a recorded call, as it will become intelligibly audible.
Our work demonstrates a completely covert voice path that is inaudible with no visual indication. We have also provided a way to record any call by breaking the limitation inherent in AudioRecord, which only allows for recording of the uplink voice. We also handle call states within the call monitor to avoid blocking user-initiated calls during exfiltration. Note that in this research we have implemented-and only discuss-audio data exfiltration. However, this is a superficial limitation, and we could easily exfiltrate data of any type.
Infection mechanism
In spite of its attempts to providing security to applications and data, Android remains vulnerable due to architectural and practical limitations. We briefly mention some of these issues below, following the work of Drake [7] and Elenkov [8] .
Android uses shared libraries to implement APIs at the HAL layer and uses dex jar files for implementing APIs at the application layer. If we know the Android version of a phone (which can be easily determined), we can build a shared library or a dex jar files for the appropriate version in the AOSP, and install it on the device, once the device is rooted. Rooting a device is routinely done by adversaries.
Another vulnerability of Android lies in the fact that an application can potentially run in the process of another application and can enjoy the privileges of the host application. The only real protection provided by Android is that the incumbent application should be signed with the same certificate as the host application. There are multiple ways of overcoming this restriction, including use of publicly available signing tools [3] .
Another general vulnerable is that Android hides APIs by using the @hide pragma of Java and creating a rule in the ADT plugin used by SDK. This security arrangement is easily breakable with tools like d2j_dex2jar that can extract the Java jar files from dex code and include those in the SDK. A simple hack in ADT can easily be done to work around the ADT rule. After including the extracted jar files from dex jar files and removing the ADT rule, all of the hidden APIs can be accessed using Java reflection. Java reflection even allows access to private fields and methods.
Finally, it is worth noting that all security mechanisms implemented by Android end at the Java layer. Access to the HAL layer (on a rooted device), bypasses all Androidspecific security layers. Once the device is rooted, the HAL layer opens a wide attack surface. Modifying the HAL layer via open source or using the needed API from this layer is straightforward. Our work demonstrates the exploitation of all of the Android vulnerabilities mentioned above.
Implementation
There are several parts to the implementation of our attack. Section 3.2 discusses our method for covertly watching the incoming phone numbers. This part of the implementation is also responsible for triggering the covert recording of a call, and automatically connecting to an incoming call for covert audio exfiltration.
The second part of the attack implements the covert recording of an incoming call from a specified number. As discussed in the Sect. 2.3, Android does not allow recording of both sides of a voice call-only the uplink voice stream can be recorded. Section 3.4 discusses our method for removing this restriction.
The final part of our implementation deals with inaudible exfiltration or replay of an audio stream directly into a voice call. As discussed in Sect. 2.4, this feature is simply not available in Android and hence a major code change is required to overcome this limitation. Section 3.3 discusses our much simplified implementation for injecting any audio data covertly into a voice call.
Before delving into the details, we mention that a strong understanding of the Android programming environment and methodology is an essential skill for generating an attack such as ours. The Android programming concepts and examples illustrated in [13] have been extremely useful for the authors in this regard.
The development environment
In this research, all Android applications and libraries are compiled and built on a host system using the cross compilation and build tootkits for the target mobile device. Our host system consists of Ubuntu 14.04 LTS running on Windows 7 based VMPlayer. We used Eclipse Luna with the Android Development Tool (ADT) plugin. Eclipse provides an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) for developing Android applications. Both the Android SDK and the Android Open Source Project (AOSP) source tree are installed on the host. The SDK and ADT plugin together provide the API, the toolkit, and the build rules for Android Target phone firmware application development. AOSP comes with the required toolkit for building the shared libraries and dex modules, such as framework.jar [2, 10] . In addition to the standard tools mentioned above, several other tools are needed for various uses, including rooting the device, signing the application, and extracting dex files. Table 2 lists the tools and devices used for our attack implementation.
Rooting of the target phone device is a critical step in our attack implementation. We could have used the rooting process as explained in [5] , but we chose instead to build and download Android on the target device in debug mode, giving us automatic root access [7] . To use certain hidden APIs, the SDK needed to be extended with the class files of certain core classes in the framework and telephony modules. This was achieved by extracting the required jar files from the dex modules in the target device using the d2j_dex2jar tool.
Eclipse needed to be configured to set up the SDK path, to build system applications, and to enable access to hidden APIs. The Android ADT plugin in Eclipse requires some hacking to permitting use of hidden APIs; additional details can be found in [15] .
Implanting a call monitor
The call monitor application needs to share the process of PhoneApp so that it can register to receive call notifications. The call monitor is implemented as an Android service application and is inserted inside the PhoneApp process, in effect acting as a man-in-the-middle. This approach is similar to the work of Aloraini [1] . However, we handle the call states in the call monitor, as opposed to simply blocking the handlers. Our approach makes call tapping fully covert, as discussed in Sect. 2.5.
To share the PhoneApp process, the application must have the same user ID and certificate as the PhoneApp. As the PhoneApp is installed as a system application, our application is installed under /system/app. See the report [15] for details on the entries that appear in the manifest, and the steps required to sign the application.
To insert our call monitor between BasePhone and CallManager, the references to BasePhone and CallManager, and their corresponding call handlers are obtained using Java reflection. The CallManager has a single handler that is used to handle all call-related notifications. Our call monitor application registers itself with BasePhone and de-registers the CallManager handler from BasePhone. The application then registers the CallManager handler to itself. This process inserts the application between the BasePhone and CallManager, allowing our application it receive call notifications prior to CallManager. Figure 4 illustrates where this call monitor is positioned within the telephony stack. Figures 5, 6 , and 7 show essential code snippets for placing the call monitor between the BasePhone and the CallManager.
The call monitor is responsible for monitoring incoming calls and suppressing any visual indication when an audio replay occurs. In our implementation, we hardcoded a phone number that will trigger covert recording, and another number that will trigger the covert replay of a recorded call-we refer to the former as the recorded number and the latter as the playback number.
When the call monitor detects the incoming call from the recorded number, it starts recording using our modified AudioRecord API. The incoming call notifications are also passed to CallManager so that the call appears to be a normal call in every respect. Our reference implementation has a hardcoded file name to store the recording.
When an incoming call from the playback number is detected, the call monitor automatically connects the call and suppresses the incoming call notification which would otherwise be sent to CallManager. Hence, CallNotifier is never invoked and the user obtains no visual indication that a call is taking place. The call monitor also starts the playback by calling the MyAudioTrack API. This API uses the tinyalsa API to send the audio stream directly into the voice call. Next, we describe our implementation of MyAudioTrack.
Implementing soundless replay of audio data
Audio files are played using flinger to feed the stream into an output device, such as the speaker. Voice call streams are fed to the standard input and output devices. Flinger is coded in such a way that it would require considerable re-design and coding to disassociate the connections of a voice call streams from the channels of the audio devices. However our research has identified a shortcut path to directly feed the audio file stream into a voice call uplink stream. Our mechanism uses the fact that with root permission, it is possible to read and write the PCM stream by making direct calls to the tinyalsa API. This mechanism bypasses flinger, enabling us to make the replay completely soundless. We have implemented a user level API, MyAudioTrack, that interfaces with tinyalsa using the standard JNI and C++ object. This approach allows for access to tinyalsa from the user application level. Figure 8 illustrates the mechanism that we have just described.
The user interface of MyAudioTrack is integrated with framework.jar. The JNI for this API is cre- Fig. 8 Modified AudioTrack uses direct call to tinyalsa Fig. 9 Writing data directly into the PCM stream ated and integrated in libandroid_runtime.so, and MyAudioTrack.cpp is created and integrated in libmedia.so. MyAudioTrack provides a play method for the audio of the voice call. The play method is implemented in the C++ part of MyAudioTrack, and uses tinyalsa APIs to write directly to the baseband device. Figure 9 gives pseudo code for the method we used to insert the PCM data from a file directly into the baseband device.
Recording a voice call
The audio policy implemented by Android restricts the voice recording stream so that it can only be fed from the microphone input stream, which implies that only the uplink voice can be recorded. Recording the downlink stream is prevented by excluding the voice call device from the list of input devices in the audio configuration file, and by dropping the channel entries for a voice call from the list of channels in the sInChannelsNameToEnumTable array.
As a workaround, we first need to make entries in the audio_policy.conf file. To enable recording, the voice call device symbol, AUDIO_DEVICE_IN_VOICE_CALL, and its profile data are added to the policy configuration file. The required voice channels are entered in the sInChannelsNameToEnumTable array in the AudioPolicyManagerBase.cpp file. In addition, the hidden audioParamCheck method of AudioRecord class is made aware of the uplink and downlink voice channels. Figure 10 shows the entry for the voice call device, while Fig. 11 shows the profile entry. Both entries are added to the audio policy configuration file.
Next, we make changes to AudioRecord and AudioPolicyManagerBase.cpp. Figure 12 gives a code snippet for adding the voice call channels to the audioParamCheck method of the user interface part of AudioRecord API. This modification is needed to make AudioRecord recognize these channels. Figure 13 illustrates the insertion of the voice call channels in the sInChannelsNameToEnumTable list. This addition is needed for flinger to recognize these channels. And finally, Fig. 14 illustrates how the AudioRecord API can be called to record a voice call.
Installation
After making the code changes described above, the modules are compiled, built and downloaded to the device. These steps are routine; see [15] for additional details. Table 3 shows the modules that are built and their destination locations in the target phone device.
Experiments
We conducted experiments to verify that our attack functions as expected, and that the attack is completely covert. The experiment to covertly record a both sides of a call is described in Sect. 4.1. Section 4.2 describes the exfiltration of a previously-recorded call, and Sect. 4.3 describes the exfiltration of a large music file. As part of these experiments, we confirm the normal behavior of the victim phone in the presence of the attack. That is, we confirm that the attack is completely covert, with no visual or audio clues available to the victim.
Covertly recording a call
This experiment verifies the recording of both the uplink and downlink voice streams when a call comes from a specified phone number. Figure 15a illustrates this experiment.
When a call comes from the pre-determined number (the recorded number), the recording starts and is stored in a file in the root directory. To verify the recording quality, this recorded file was pulled to the host and replayed using aplay, which is available in Ubuntu 14.04 LTS using the command line aplay -t raw -c 2 -f S16_LE -r 44100 record.pcm
We found that the replay audio is clear for both streams, and hence the conversation was recorded as expected.
Covertly replaying a recorded call
Our replay experiment is illustrated in Fig. 15b . In this case, we verify covert replay of the same recorded audio file obtained in the experiment in Sect. 4.1. The expectation was that when a call comes from a predetermined number (the playback number), the call will be connected without showing any visual indication and the audio file will be replayed to the other end of the call without any audio played on the local device. We verified these expected outcomes. The audibility of uplink voice was clear, but the downlink voice was somewhat less clear, although still audible. This is almost certainly due to the fact that we used only the default static mixer when replaying the audio file to the voice call device. With proper tuning, the downlink audio would likely be as clear as the uplink.
Replaying a large music file
This experiment is similar to the experiment in Sect. 4.2, except that a large WAV file was used for replay. The file played for around 4 minutes with clear audibility at the other end. As expected, in this case the call and playback remained completely covert on the victims phone. This illustrates that the length of the call is not a factor, and that exfiltration of other data is feasible.
Summary of results
The results from these experiments confirm that our attack is completely covert, that is, from the victim's perspective, no unexpected audio or visual effects occur. These experiments have been repeated many times with satisfactory results in each case.
Countermeasures?
The purpose of this research is to expose potential attacks on Android phones by exploiting existing vulnerabilities. Our specific attack leverages the fact that shared libraries and dex jar files can be built and installed on any rooted mobile device (once the Android version is known). This attack is practical, and with some additional effort, the attack software could certainly be installed on victim phone via malware, so that physical access is not required. We believe that our attack, and related attacks, pose significant challenges with respect to effective countermeasures. Along with all of the usual difficulties inherent in software self-defense, realistic countermeasure are hindered by the fact that Android is open source.
A crucial part of our attack is the covert recording of a call. The key vector in this attack is the plaintext audio_policy.conf file. We were easily able to include the voice call input device and its profile in this file. It is tempting to suggest encrypting this file. However, encryption would only be useful provided that the decryption key is not readily available to an attacker, and it is not clear how this could be accomplished within the Android architecture.
The covert replay part of our attack also appears to be difficult to mitigate. The crucial attack vector here is the open source tinyalsa that we used for baseband device access. Use of a proprietary APIs for baseband access is a possible countermeasure. However, this would cut against the Android open source posture, and it would not prevent an attackalthough it would make such an attack significantly more challenging.
Another approach would be to deploy a tamper detection mechanism for the shared libraries. Use of cryptographic hashes might be a viable option. However, this approach would only be as secure as the stored hash values are tamperresistant. Storing hash values in the pre-boot modules (such as initrd) might be an option, but this is not a strong defense, and it would tend to interfere with legitimate experimentation.
In short, the attack discussed in this paper is not easy to mitigate within the limitations of the Android architecture. As with many software security issues, the best we can realistically hope for is to make the attack more challenging. But even this relatively modest goal is difficult to achieve, since once the attacker has root access, there is nothing to prevent such an attack.
Conclusion
This paper presents a proof of concept implementation for using a voice call as a completely covert channel for data exfiltration. To achieve this, a call monitor is inserted in the telephony stack to monitoring incoming calls. When an incoming call from a specified number is detected, the call is covertly recorded. Then when a call from another specified number is detected the previously recorded call is covertly replayed. The entire attack is completely covert, as there is no visual or audio indication available to the victim.
Our implementation breaks multiple security boundaries within Android. The recording of a two-way conversation during a voice call overcomes a restriction of the Android audio policy manager. Replaying an audio stream breaks a restriction on the audio path.
In our approach we have exploited Android's dependence on shared libraries. Shared libraries can be built easily in AOSP for any published Android version, and they can easily be inserted into a rooted mobile device. We argued that our approach presents a difficult technical (and business) challenge with respect to attack mitigation.
Our current implementation is limited to only audio data exfiltration. Published research [1, 6, 9] shows that various data can be audio modulated prior to exfiltration. Based on such works, our attack can be enhanced for generic data exfiltration. Furthermore, our method of data exfiltration over a voice call overcomes the distance limitations seen in most of the previous published research.
